The ongoing pandemic crisis has presented a fertile ground for authoritarian leaders to seize opportunities and advance their agendas. Countries like Hungary, Turkey, and the Philippines have capitalized on the situation to enact measures that encroach upon personal freedoms, weaken media independence, and exercise control over social media platforms through newly enacted legislation. The crisis has enabled these leaders to solidify their power, often at the expense of constitutional rights, utilizing mechanisms such as militarized law enforcement. This erosion of the checks and balances inherent in constitutional democracy has provided a veneer of legitimacy to these leaders’ actions.
An illustrative example lies in the adoption of surveillance technologies, including biometric tracking and facial recognition applications, ostensibly for effective quarantine management and public health interests. Despite these proclaimed objectives, the collection of personal data raises concerns about potential misuse to curtail individual liberties and discipline dissenters.
Surprisingly, there has been a limited outcry from citizens against these authoritarian measures, with notable resistance primarily observed within academic circles. Understanding the legitimization of such powers by authoritarians and the acquiescence of citizens warrants deeper investigation. The prevailing narrative emerges from a shift in citizens’ normative expectations during crises or shocks. This shift influences their perception of governmental actions, often leading to rationalizations that view these measures as serving the greater public good. In times of crisis, citizens may prioritize survival over personal freedom, altering their normative and fairness considerations. This change in mindset can inadvertently enable leaders to exploit the uncertainty of a crisis to their advantage.
Exploring the impact of changing normative expectations on fairness concerns can be illuminated through an economic experiment known as the ultimatum game. In this game, two players engage in a bargaining scenario, where one proposes a payoff division to the other. The responder’s acceptance or rejection of the offer reveals insights into fairness perceptions.
Consider the scenario where the responder accepts the offer. Traditionally, an equitable split (50:50) is often deemed fair (x = ½), yet empirical observations indicate that offers below 30% are frequently rejected. Introducing an element of noise into the system, where the received payoff differs from the proposed amount (x*), reveals interesting dynamics. When noise is not common knowledge, lesser offers tend to be rejected, and offers close to or exceeding 50% are favored.
However, when both proposer and responder are aware of the noise in the system, a shift occurs. Responders are more inclined to accept smaller offers, as skepticism about the proposer’s intentions diminishes. Simultaneously, proposers recognize that smaller offers (x*<< ½) are more likely to be accepted, prompting them to make minimum offers (x<< ½). This common understanding of noise allows for the exploitation of uncertainty, as receivers’ normative expectations shift, eroding the likelihood of questioning the proposer’s motives.
This dynamic mirrors the subdued response of citizens to governmental actions during crises. The pervasive shocks serve to reshape normative expectations, creating a context in which leaders can maneuver with relative impunity, leveraging the prioritization of survival over personal freedom.
1.Falk, A., Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. On the Nature of Fair Behaviour. Econ. Inq. 41, 20–26 (2003).
2.Bicchieri, C. & Chavez, A. Behaving as expected: Public information and fairness norms. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 23, 161–178 (2010).
